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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether ESG transparency, the extent of ESG disclosure, has an impact on 
firm value. Reducing investors’ information symmetry and agency costs is the mechanism by 
which better ESG transparency potentially impacts firm value. Using the Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure scores to assess a firm’s ESG transparency, we look at a sample of 1996 large cap 
companies across 47 developed and emerging countries and territories. Our empirical 
analyses suggest that the benefits from ESG disclosure outweigh their costs for the average 
listed firm. We find supporting evidence for greater disclosure of ESG issues boosting firm 
valuation measures, such as Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, our results suggest that firms with 
greater asset size, better liquidity, higher R&D intensity, fewer insider holdings, good past 
financial performance will be more transparent in ESG issues.  
 
 
Keywords: ESG disclosure, sustainable development, stakeholder engagement, 
environmental policy, corporate governance. 
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I. Introduction 
 
There has been a rapidly growing interest in ESG issues from individual shareholders, 
institutional investors, governments, local communities, employees and suppliers over the 
past ten years (Hill et al., 2007; Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2013). The Governance and 
Accountability Institute (2017) shows that 82% of the S&P 500 companies had embraced 
sustainability reporting in 2017, while this was the case for only 53% of S&P 500 companies 
in 2012. An interesting example for this is shown by how investors are ahead of ESG issues. 
FTSE Russell ruled out the addition of zero voting rights stocks because of concerns raised 
by shareholders. Consequently, the investment management industry is starting to 
accommodate ESG issues. Meanwhile, in order to respond to a growing stakeholders’ interest 
in ESG data, rating agencies (i.e. MSCI, Thomson Reuters Asset4 rating agency), financial 
information providers (i.e., Bloomberg) and firms also report ESG data, which stands for 
environmental (total greenhouse gas Emissions, hazardous waste, environmental fines, etc.), 
social (the percentage of employee turnover, community spending etc.) and governance data 
(board duration, political donations, etc.), respectively.  
 
The ESG literature has focussed on measures of corporate ESG performance and their link to 
financial performance (Ruf et al., 1998; King and Lenox, 2000; Eccles et al., 2001; Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003). Some scholars study whether ESG criteria can be viewed as a potential 
key factor for investment success (Richardson, 2009), and whether shareholders prefer to 
invest in firms with a better CSR image, which may result in better financial performances 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003; De Bakker, 2005). However, there is little research that focusses 
on a firm’s ESG transparency and the quantity of ESG disclosure. To fill this gap, our 
analysis is based on data related to the extent of ESG disclosure, rather than firms’ actual 
performance on ESG issues. We first examine how listed-firms’ ESG transparency can 
impact their performance. Then we perform supplementary analyses to model the 
determinants of ESG transparency.  
 
In this study, we use the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score to assess firms’ transparency. 
Bloomberg compiles ESG data on publicly-listed companies globally from published 
disclosure and news items, and turns it into one number. More precisely, the Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure scores measure the amount of ESG disclosure data a company reports publicly, but 
does not measure the company's actual ESG performance. Zero to 100 is the range of the 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure score, which shows that the higher the disclosure score, the more 
information disclosed.  
 
We investigate ESG transparency over time and across countries. The sample components of 
this study are selected from the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI). We show 
empirically that ESG transparency significantly influences firms’ Tobin’s Q, and confirm that 
there is a non-liner relationship between ESG transparency and Tobin’s Q. Our empirical 
results can be interpreted as supporting evidence for promoting ESG transparency. The 
implications of this study are significant. We provide the following recommendations related 
to ESG transparency. Firms are encouraged to report ESG data together with the financial 
information that they are required to report to shareholders. We recommend investors pay 
more attention to ESG transparency along with traditional financial statements, and to 
support firms to increase the quantity of ESG disclosure. 
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the current 
development of ESG disclosure and the responses to ESG transparency by relevant 
stakeholder parties. In Section III, we describe our data and research design. We present the 
empirical results in Section IV. Finally, we summarize and conclude in Section VI. 
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II. Responses to transparency in ESG issues  
 
In response to growing pressure for ESG transparency and corporate accountability, firms 
have started to report ESG data as a nonfinancial report, in addition to traditional financial 
reports. However, the content of these nonfinancial reports varies widely due to the lack of 
regulatory guidelines on how to report this information. In this section, we outline the 
challenges of ESG transparency and discuss how relevant stakeholder parties influence on 
this issue.  
 
2.1 Current development of mandatory and voluntary ESG disclosure  
 
Previous studies (Bennear and Olmstead, 2008; Jin and Leslie, 2003) document that 
mandatory disclosure regulations can improve operating performance with regard to water 
safety and the environment. KPMG (2016) identify around two-thirds of sustainability 
reporting instruments are mandatory and about one-third voluntary.  
 
ESG mandatory disclosure 
Government regulation is considered the most important of sustainability reporting 
instruments. In OECD countries, new sustainability reporting requirements are introduced 
through accounting regulations and company acts that address reporting with a special focus 
on certain matters, such as environmental pollutants and corporate governance. In many 
countries, increasing mandatory ESG disclosure requirements are introduced through 
government regulations. For example, based on the “Quoted companies GHG reporting” 
issued in 2013, UK requires corporations listed on the London Stock Exchange to report their 
levels of greenhouse gas emissions. Firms in China are required to disclose environmental 
information, according to the Environmental Information Disclosure Act issued by the 
Chinese government in 2008. Mexico passed the Climate Change law in 2012, which 
addresses climate change and the transition to a green economy by setting requirements for 
mandatory emission measurement and reporting. Overall, the level of mandatory ESG 
disclosure is growing, which may be interpreted as a sign of the increasing importance of 
ESG transparency.  
 
ESG voluntary disclosure 
Mandatory ESG disclosure dominates, but the growth in voluntary disclosure is also strong. 
Companies in the European Union are adapting to the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive 
issued in 2014 although the directive does not specify standards that firms should follow in 
disclosing relevant information, such as environmental matters, human rights or board 
diversity. However, Germany is an exception. The German Sustainability Code, which was 
issued in 2011 as a voluntary guidance in Germany and can be furnished using a template, 
features twenty indicators of sustainability performance aligned with the GRI Guidelines, the 
UNGC principles and the OECD guidelines for MNCs. In 2011, the Institute of Company 
Secretaries of India proposed a guidance note on non-financial disclosure to help firms to 
voluntarily make appropriate disclosures beyond the narrow focus of financial information 
disclosure. 
 
 
2.2 Global responses to ESG disclosure 
 
The quality and quantity of ESG disclosure data have increased dramatically in the last two 
decades. However, the ESG data still lack comparability across firms and countries. Here, we 
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discuss how different market participants have been influencing the latest development of 
ESG transparency.  
 
Stock exchanges and market regulators  
Stock exchanges can create listing guidelines around ESG disclosures, while securities 
regulators can promote an improvement of the availability of ESG data. For instance, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection in China, together with the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, launched the Green Security Law in 2008. The Green Securities policy requires 
firms listed on the stock exchange in China to disclose more information about their 
environmental record. According to The Company Act issued in 2006, quoted companies in 
the UK should also disclose information in their annual review on environmental, employee, 
social and community matters, for an understanding of the performance and development of 
the company. By following United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchange initiative (2017), 
stock exchanges can self-regulate regarding ESG disclosure. There are sixty-six partner 
exchanges with the UN Sustainable Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2017. The UN Sustainable 
Stock Exchange initiative encourages exchanges to make a voluntary commitment to promote 
improved ESG disclosure and actual ESG performance among listed companies. 
 
Policy makers and corporate reporting organisations 
The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (2006) encourage the relevant 
stakeholder parties to incorporate ESG issues into their investment analyses. The United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment has about 1813 signatories in October 2017, 
which cover asset owners, investment managers and service providers. Corporate reporting 
organisations that are independent and non-profit also have an impact on ESG disclosure. For 
instance, the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) develops and propagates 
sustainability accounting standards. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is another similar 
independent organization that helps relevant stakeholder parties understand their impact on 
issues such as climate change, corruption and human rights. The SASB and GRI Guidelines 
are often adopted for the sustainability reports. Overall, those corporate reporting 
organisations work towards making disclosure comparable and decision-useful for investors.  
 
Independent sources 
Several independent sources supply ESG data. Avetisyan and Hockerts (2017) document how 
ESG rating agencies, such as EIRIS Foundation, Morgan Stanley Capital International, Vigeo 
and Sustainable Asset Management (SAM), provide data on the social performance of firms. 
Data on the impact of environmental performance of the listed US firms is compiled by 
investor research firms, such as KLD Research & Analytics, Ceres, Trucost, the Standard and 
Poor’s Corporation-Newsweek. Moreover, CorporateRegister.com provides the Reputation 
Score based on an opinion survey of corporate social responsibility professionals, academics 
and other environmental experts. Overall, there has been a trend towards specialised ESG 
rating agencies (Koellner et al., 2005; Delmas and Blass, 2010; Lai et al., 2016). 
 
Capital market stakeholders 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), who manage the world’s largest sovereign 
wealth fund, can be viewed as an example of how institutional investors respond to ESG 
issues. The Norwegian fund set investment criteria focussing on three areas: climate change, 
water and children’s rights. By doing so, investors can place pressure on their target investing 
firms – and incentivise the managers to improve their ESG disclosure and actual ESG 
performance.  
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Individual firms 
Slager et al. (2012) document that more companies begin to value their ESG ratings and 
communicate with interested parties about ESG issues both internally and externally. Firms 
are becoming more sophisticated in their communications with the public regarding ESG 
issues (Hockerts and Moir, 2004; Vandekerckhove et al., 2008). Eccles et al. (2014) suggest 
that since high sustainability firms are more long-term oriented, they are more likely to attract 
long-term investors. There has also been a trend that firms report information to stakeholders 
beyond just shareholders only. Corporation operations affect not only communities but also 
natural environments in which they operate. For instance, Shell was reported to be 
responsible for over 20 pollution accidents in British waters in 2013.  
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III. Research design 
 
Having surveyed the state of ESG disclosure, we now move on to identifying a gap in the 
literature that our paper is aiming to fill. While there are some studies on ESG performance, 
very little research has been conducted on ESG transparency and its impact on firm value. 
This section describes the research design and hypotheses used in our investigation along 
with the relevant literature. Our first task is to establish whether a firm’s transparency in ESG 
issues can influence its value. We assume that all firms are concerned with maximizing firm 
value. Furthermore, we seek to model and examine the determinants of ESG disclosure. 
 
3.1 Firm’s ESG transparency and firm value  
 
Will companies’ choice of ESG disclosure level influence firm value? To answer this 
research question, we start with a brief review of the studies that focus on disclosure benefits 
and costs.  
 
Eccles et al. (2014) find that high sustainability firms, which are more long-term oriented, 
have superior ESG measurement and better disclosure practices. Other researchers (Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003; Galbreath, 2013) document that firms with better ESG transparency are 
more likely to obtain capital at a lower cost because of a better operational reputation, 
resulting in lower reputational risk. Cheng et al. (2014) document that firms with better ESG 
actual performance-related scores can benefit from lower capital constraints. Serafeim and 
Grewal (2017) suggest that nonfinancial information can be used to predict expected future 
financial performance of the firm. Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2017) find that ESG-
based investing would have helped investors avoid 90% of bankruptcies in the time frame 
they examined. Conversely, some scholars argue that there is a significant cost associated 
with the levels of ESG disclosure. For instance, Aggarwal and Dow (2011) suggest that a 
firm’s physical assets can be treated as the direct costs associated with regulatory compliance 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2012) document that 
customers are less willing to pay a premium for green products and services in price-sensitive 
market segments. Mattoo et el. (2009) suggest that international trade makes it possible to 
seek and take advantage of less expensive climate change regulation regimes.  
 
The relevant literature review leads to the development of our research design. By modelling 
the following four estimating equations, we assess how value-maximizing firms shape their 
responses in ESG transparency issues. We predict that rational managers aim to balance the 
disclosure benefits and the disclosure costs by finding the optimal ESG disclosure level. Our 
model below explains why an increase of ESG disclosure degree beyond a certain level may 
deteriorate firm performance rather than enhance it.  
 
We start with Equation (1), which posits that the firm’s performance tTP is a positive function 
of x , measured here at the disclosure level of ESG. We assume ESG disclosure level can 
enhance firm’s total performance.  
 
.rTTP x            Eq (1)  
 
By assuming 0  and  0r  , a positive impact of the ESG disclosure level is posited on the 
firm’s performance through the magnitude and the slope.  
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Meanwhile, there is also a significant cost associated with the levels of ESG disclosure, see 
Equation (2) below. This negative relationship is written as: 
 
 
,tEFTP bx            Eq (2) 
where 0b   and  0t  . 
 
The overall impact of the ESG disclosure on the firm’s performance is the sum of these two 
equations, where rax  represents the positive impact proposed by Equation (1) and 
tbx
represents the negative impact proposed by Equation (2): 
 
     T EF
r tTP x TP x TP x x bx             Eq (3) 
 
Based on Equation (3), the values of , ,  a b r and t  determine the shape of the function of the 
firm’s performance. A linear relationship will only exist if 1r t  . However, if r t , an 
inverse U-shaped will be formed. Otherwise, if r t , the function of company performance 
will be U-shaped. The three equations discussed above allow for potential non-linearities in 
the relationship between ESG disclosure and firm performance.  
 
Therefore, we include a linear term for ESG disclosure, and the quadratic term “ESG 
disclosure^2” in Equation (4). Following previous studies (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997; Lee et al., 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Aggarwal and Dow, 2011), we 
measure the firm’s long-term value by Tobin’s Q. Equation (4) is given as: 
 
(Industry-adjusted Tobin Q) = a0+a1*(adjusted ESG disclosure)+a2*(adjusted ESG 
disclosure)^2 + a3*log(firm size)+a4*(adjusted leverage ratio)+a5*(liquidity ratio)+a6*(GDP 
per capita based on PPP)+a7*(R&D intensity)+a8*(percentage of independent 
directors)+a9*( institutional ownership)+ Ɛ( residual) 
 
 Eq (4) 
 
*Where: We include the key variables (ESG), (ESG)^2, and control variables that have been 
shown to have an association with Tobin’s Q. The definitions for all variables in Equation (4) 
are shown in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 presents the definition and our estimation methods for all variables in this study. 
  
[Insert Table 1]  
 
 
3.1.1 ESG disclosure and Environmental disclosure – indicator of firm transparency 
 
In this study, we focus on firm transparency rather than the firm’s actual performance in ESG 
issues. We identify the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score as an appropriate indicator to 
measure firms’ transparency. The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score is designed to measure 
the amount of ESG data that firms report publicly, and does not measure the firm’s 
performance. The score is realised based on the extent of a company’s Environmental, Social, 
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and Governance (ESG) disclosure. The score starts at 0.1 for firms that disclose a minimum 
amount of ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. 
Firms that do not disclose anything is shown as N/A. Each data point is weighted regarding 
its importance (i.e., with data such as greenhouse gas emissions carrying greater weight than 
other disclosures). The Bloomberg ESG disclosure score is also tailored to different industry 
sectors. Based on the methodology of the Bloomberg ESG score, we assume that this 
disclosure score can be viewed as the reflection of a firm’s voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures, which help shareholders and stakeholders assess a publicly listed company’s 
transparency. The higher the disclosure score, the more non-financial information is 
disclosed.  
 
We are also interested in examining whether a firm’s environmental disclosure level has an 
impact on its Tobin’s Q. Using a similar methodology, the Bloomberg Environmental 
disclosure score is compiled based on the extent of a company’s environmental disclosure. 
The range of the Bloomberg environmental disclosure score is between 0.1 and 100. Each 
data point is weighted according to its importance.  
 
 
3.1.2 R&D intensity – indicator of the agency and monitoring costs 
 
If a firm is more transparent than its peers, its shareholders and stakeholders may have a 
greater ability to monitor the managerial team. Smith and Watts (1992) state that agency 
costs and moral hazard problems are likely to occur in firms with high growth opportunities. 
Cheng et al. (2014) document that to increase ESG disclosure can reduce information 
symmetry and agency costs by enhancing stakeholder engagement. Miller and Reisel (2012) 
and Zhu and Kai (2014) also suggest that legal protection and accounting disclosure 
requirements are likely to decrease information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent. By following previous studies (Himmelberg et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2008), we measure 
the agency and monitoring costs by using the variable of R&D intensity. We include R&D 
intensity in Equation (4). We assume that R&D intensity is likely positively associated with 
the agency cost related to managerial monitoring for firms that are difficult to monitor. Based 
on agency proxies, we can examine whether more transparency in ESG issues can reduce 
agency costs associated with moral hazard problems and information asymmetry between 
principals and agents.  
 
Finally, our discussion in 3.1 leads to Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b):  
 
Hypothesis 1(a): We assume that the association between a firm’s performance and the ESG 
disclosure is conditional on agency costs and governance structures. A publicly-listed 
company’s transparency in ESG issues can impact its Tobin’s Q. We predict that the 
relationship between firm performance and ESG disclosure is not linear. 
 
Hypothesis 1(b): We assume that the association between a firm’s performance and the 
Environmental disclosure is conditional on agency costs and governance structures. A 
publicly-listed company’s transparency in environmental issues can impact its Tobin’s Q. We 
predict that the relationship between firm performance and Environmental disclosure is not 
linear. 
 
We report our empirical results of Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) in Section 4. 
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3.2 Examining the determinants of a firm’s ESG transparency: Country versus firm effects  
 
Hebb (2006) documents that transparency not only aligns shareholders and managers, it also 
allows other stakeholders to engage and to control the behaviour within a firm. Here, we 
model the determinants of ESG transparency and group these possible determinants into two 
categories: firm-level and country-level.  
 
3.2.1 At country level 
 
Previous contributions to the literature (De Soto, 1989; Gnyawali, 1996; Husted, 2005) 
suggest that economic development is the key driver behind environment sustainability. For 
instance, Gnyawali (1996) finds that people in richer countries make more demands on firms 
for environmental and socially responsible performance because they are better informed. 
Therefore, we examine whether the level of economic development can help to explain why 
some countries have better ESG transparency than other countries.  
 
To represent the economic development of these 47 sample countries and territories, we use 
the natural logarithm of per capita gross domestic product converted to US dollars at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. This is the measure we prefer when 
comparing living conditions or when looking at per-capita welfare across countries. A 
nation’s GDP at PPP exchange rates is the sum value of all the services and goods produced 
in the country, valued at prices prevailing in the United States. Overall, the PPP exchange 
rates are relatively stable over time. We use data from the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook Database. This leads to Hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2. ESG disclosure is high in countries where the level of economic development 
is high. 
 
We also adopt the corruption index data as one of our control variables, sourced from 
Transparency International. Augustine (2012) documents that corporate governance has both 
external and internal dimensions, which can complement each other. Therefore, from the 
view of external dimension, we use the corruption index to view the larger context where 
these listed-firms operate. Nevertheless, no corruption index data is available for five sample 
countries: Indonesia, Colombia, Thailand, Philippines and Egypt.  
 
3.2.2 At firm level 
 
An effective governance framework (i.e. independent board directors, institutional investor, 
insider holdings, board size, etc.) is likely to reduce the agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control. Studies examine the direct monitoring approach as one 
of the effective governance mechanisms that can overcome control problems (Dahya et al., 
2007; Lee et al., 2008; Lee and Lee, 2009; Liu et al., 2015; Palmberg, 2015). Moreover, 
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) state that many of these governance mechanisms can serve as 
substitutes for one another. Chen et al. (2009) holds a similar view and suggest that in 
countries with weak legal protection of investors, firm-level corporate governance can 
supplement country-level shareholder protection in reducing the cost of equity.  
 
Palmberg (2015) documents that independent directors of Swedish listed firms have a 
positive impact on firms’ investment performance. However, other studies have a conflicting 
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view. Adams and Jiang (2016) examine the UK’s property-casualty insurance industry and 
find that superior performance can be attributed to the financial expertise of inside directors 
rather than to the proportion of outside directors on the board, which is unrelated to 
performance. The role of institutional investment in promoting long-term environmental 
performance is ambiguous. By examining the 500 largest US firms Aggarwal and Dow 
(2011) show that institutional ownership brings a significantly negative impact on firms’ 
environmental policy. Trucost (2009) suggests that institutional investors do not consider 
carbon exposure to be an essential criterion in firm allocation decision.  
 
Given the evidence from the corporate governance literature, we propose to include the 
corporate governance structure at the firm level as variables in our model. This lead to 
Hypothesis 3. We measure the degree of direct monitoring by the following four factors: (a) 
insider holdings, (b) institutional ownership, (c) percentages of independent directors and (d) 
board size. In this hypothesis, we examine whether there a change in one of these four factors 
has any impact on ESG transparency.  
 
Hypothesis 3: (a) An increased percentage of insider holdings is associated with a negative 
impact on ESG disclosure (b) An increased percentage of institutional ownership will bring a 
negative impact on ESG disclosure (c) An increased percentage of independent directors will 
bring a positive impact on ESG disclosure (d) A greater board size will bring a positive 
impact on ESG disclosure. 
 
Finally, the estimating equation for our Hypotheses 2 and 3 is shown as follows: 
 
(Industry-adjusted ESG disclosure) = b0+b1*log(firm size)+b2*(adjusted ROA)+ 
b3*log(adjusted leverage ratio)+b4*(liquidity ratio)+b5*( R&D intensity)+b6*(Insider 
holdings)+ b7*(Institutional ownership) + b8*(percentage of independent directors)+ 
b9*(percentage of women in management) + b10*log(board size)+b11*(GDP per capita based 
on PPP)+ b12*(corruption)+ Ɛ( residual) 
 
 Eq (5) 
 
Where: The definitions for all variables in Equation (5) are in Table 1.  
Finally, for robustness checks, we also replace ROA with the following firm performance 
indicators: operating margin, three-year average return on equity, five-year average return on 
equity and P/B ratio. We present our empirical results of Hypotheses 2 and 3 in Section 4. 
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IV. Data Sources and Empirical Results 
 
We report and interpret our empirical results in this section.  
 
4.1 Data Sources 
 
We employ a global dataset comprised of 1996 firms, which are selected from MSCI All 
Country World Index (ACWI). This sample covers approximately 85% of the global 
investable equity by market value and includes countries from 47 developed and emerging 
countries and territories. Our sample period is from 2012 to 2016. We group these 1996 
sample firms into ten GICS sectors (refer to Table 2), but we exclude financial services firms 
due to concerns that banking and financial regulations might affect the transparency and its 
impact on performance.  
 
[Insert Table 2]  
 
We collect ESG disclosure data, Environmental disclosure data, financial statement data and 
corporate governance data from Bloomberg, while the data of GDP per capita PPP based for 
our 47 sample countries is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
Outlook Database. We also adopt the annual corruption index from Transparency 
International for these sample countries. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all key 
variables. We include sample statistics for firms for which data are available. 
 
[Insert Table 3]  
 
4.2 Econometric procedure  
We analysze our panel dataset by starting with the likelihood ratio test. If we reject the null 
hypothesis, then a panel approach – random effects model or the fixed effects model - must 
be employed. After that, we apply the Hausman test to decide which model suits our panel 
dataset better. We also adopt the White diagonal as our coefficient covariance method, which 
is robust to heteroskedasticity (Reed and Ye 2011). Finally, we carry out the normality tests 
of the residuals, which can examine whether our model is well-specified or not. All the 
residual distributions of these regressions we report in this study are normal, indicating that 
our estimating equations are well-specified.  
 
Correlations between variables are reported in Appendix Table A1. We observe that 
environmental disclosure is highly correlated to ESG disclosure (0.9618). We may say that 
for a firm with a better transparency in ESG issues is also more likely to disclose more 
information on environmental issues. In this study, we do not mix any variables that are 
highly correlated (correlation coefficient > 0.8), in the same estimating equation. This is 
commonly adopted as a rule of thumb for avoiding a multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
4.2 ESG transparency and firm value 
 
How does ESG disclosure influence a firm’s value? Using Equation (4), we investigate 
whether a publicly-listed company’s transparency in ESG issues can impact on its firm value 
as measured by Tobin’s Q. Tobin Q is estimated as the ratio of the enterprise value of the 
firm plus cash to the book value of assets. We follow previous studies (Bebchuk et al., 2009; 
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Aggarwal and Dow, 2011) by using an industry-adjusted measure of Tobin Q, since Tobin Q 
can be highly industry dependent. Meanwhile, we control for the firm’s characteristics and 
two country-level factors: the level of economic development and the corruption index.  
 
Hypothesis 1(a): We assume that the association between the firm’s performance and the ESG 
disclosure is conditional on agency costs and governance structures. A publicly-listed 
company’s transparency in ESG issues can impact its Tobin’s Q. We predict that the 
relationship between the firm’s performance and ESG disclosure is not linear. 
 
Hypothesis 1(b): We assume that the association between the firm’s performance and the 
Environmental disclosure is conditional on agency costs and governance structures. A publicly-
listed company’s transparency in environmental issues can impact its Tobin’s Q. We predict 
that the relationship between the firm’s performance and Environmental disclosure is not 
linear. 
 
We report our empirical results for Hypotheses 1(a) and 1(b) in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4]  
 
Our empirical results show that a non-linear relationship exists between ESG transparency 
and a firm’s performance. The linear term and the quadratic term of ESG disclosure are 
statistically significant. Based on Model (1) and Model (2) shown in Table 4, we interpret our 
empirical results as supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1(a). We visualize the relationship 
between ESG transparency and Tobin’s Q in through Figure 1. Furthermore, Table 3 shows 
that the average ESG transparency of our observations is 0.33. Therefore, the average score 
of ESG transparency is greater than a local minimum point at 0.2077, placing it on the right-
hand side of the U-shaped curve. Based on our empirical results (Model 1 and 2 in Table 4), 
we learn that ESG disclosure benefits exceed disclosure costs as soon as firm transparency in 
ESG issues as the disclosure score rises above 0.2077. This value is equal to 20.77 ESG 
disclosure score out of a maximum score of 100.  
 
[Insert Figure 1]  
 
Overall, since the average of ESG transparency of ESG in our sample is 0.3336 (refer to 
Table 3 and Figure1), most of our sample firms could obtain net benefits from greater ESG 
disclosure. The impact of ESG disclosure on Tobin’s Q is also economically significant. We 
find that a one-standard-deviation increase in ESG transparency can positively enhance 
Tobin’s Q by around 4.77% of the mean, all else equal. For each of these ten GICS sector in 
this study, we observe that all ten GICS sectors have an average ESG disclosure score greater 
than 20.77 points out of a maximum of 100 points (refer to Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figure 2]  
 
Our finding is similar to that of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2017) and Eccles et al. 
(2001). Eccles et al. (2001) document that if a firm’s market value is over book value, 
additional nonfinancial information can provide insights into a firm’s intangible assets that 
are not captured in traditional financial statements. In this study, we also find that ESG data 
are value-relevant. The evidence visualised in Figure 2 indicates that better ESG transparency 
is beneficial to Tobin’s Q. This finding may imply that ESG transparency can provide 
insightful information to investors and that ESG disclosure can be used as one of the methods 
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to improve a firm’s corporate governance. For instance, as stakeholders’ expectations may 
shape the image of a company, firms are likely to have an interest in adapting their 
management methods to environmental and social standards if they wish to attract investors.  
 
Furthermore, we discuss how environmental disclosure can influence on Tobin’s Q. Missing 
observations of Environmental disclosure reduce our sample size from 1996 firms to 1444 
firms. Based on Model (3) and (4) shown in Table 4, Hypothesis 1(b) is rejected. Our 
empirical results show that neither the linear term nor the quadratic term of Environmental 
disclosure is statistically significant to the performance indicator, Tobin’s Q. We suggest that 
a publicly-listed company’s environmental disclosure does not impact on its Tobin’s Q. 
 
In this study, we define R&D intensity as the sum of research and development (R&D) costs 
divided by sales for the previous three years. It takes for innovation activities to generate an 
impact on firm performance. We use R&D intensity as firms’ agency and monitoring costs. 
We find that the variable of “R&D intensity” has a statistically positive impact on a firm’s 
performance (refer to Model 1 and 2 in Table 4). Our results can be interpreted as the 
supporting evidence for our Hypothesis 1(a). For firms with greater R&D intensity, which 
imply that their assets or activities are difficult for shareholders to monitor, better ESG 
transparency can reduce the agency costs associated with moral hazard problems. Our finding 
confirms that to increase ESG disclosure can reduce investors’ information symmetry and 
agency costs, which is consistent with previous findings (Cheng et al., 2014; Miller and 
Reisel, 2012; Zhu and Kai, 2014).  
 
As for the control variables, we have a few of interesting findings. We obtain consistent 
results for the variable of log(size) in Table 4, which has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on Tobin Q. This finding may be explained by the way we select our 
sample firms.  Companies are selected from MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI), which 
captures large and mid-cap stocks across 23 developed markets and 24 emerging markets. 
The negative sign of log(size) may imply that there are diseconomies of scale. 
 
 
4.3 Determinants of ESG transparency: Country vs firm-level factors 
 
The explanatory variables that we believe will influence ESG disclosure can be grouped in 
two categories: country-level and firm level. In this section, we use Equation (5) to examine 
our Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
  
Firstly, we include a firm performance indicator, return on equity (ROA), as our key control 
variable in Equation (5). After that, we check for endogeneity issues that may be present in 
our regression analyses. We suspect that higher ROA would lead to increased ESG 
disclosure. Meanwhile, the impact on ESG disclosure may also significantly enhance ROA 
because of a possible reduction in firms’ reputational risk. We are concerned that the 
direction of causality between ROA and disclosure could run both ways. To ascertain 
whether this is the case, we use the panel least square estimation method supplemented by 
two-stage least squares estimates. We investigate this by instrumenting our ESG disclosure 
with the average growth rate of EPS in the last three years (EPS3Y).  
 
Table 5 reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic 
statistics for the ESG disclosure regression in Equation 5, using return on assets (ROA) as the 
firm performance indicator. There are six specifications for this model. The first four models 
ESG Transparency and Firm Value  
15 
 
report the regression without industry adjustment in the following three variables: ESG 
disclosure, ROA and the leverage ratio. Based on the results shown in Models from (1) to (4), 
we verify that ROA and ESG disclosure are not determined endogenously. Therefore, there is 
no two-way effect between ROA and ESG disclosure. Furthermore, in Model (5) and Model 
(6), we use an industry-adjusted measure of these three variables: ESG disclosure, ROA and 
the leverage ratio. The regression results shown in the last two models (refer to Table 5) 
suggest that the higher ROA, the more ESG transparency (disclosure) in firms.  
 
We continue by examining transparency in environmental issues. The results reported in 
Model (5) and Model (6) in Table 7 imply that a firm with a higher ROA will be more 
transparent in environmental issues. The influence of ROA on the environmental disclosure is 
positive and statistically significant. We also confirm that ROA is not endogenously 
determined by the environmental disclosure (refer to Models 1–4 in Table 7). The relevant 
2SLS results are shown in Model (2) and Model (4) in Table 7.  
 
Furthermore, for consistency and robustness, we employ four other firm performance 
indicators in place of ROA in Equation 5. These firm performance indicators are operating 
margin, the three-year average return on equity (ROE3Y), the five-year average return on 
equity (ROE5Y), and the price-to-book ratio (PB). We report the relevant empirical results in 
Table 6 and Table 8. Overall, our results (see Tables 5–8) suggest that ROA, ROE3Y and 
ROE5Y have a positive influence on ESG and environmental disclosure. Based on our 
empirical results, we can conclude that a firm with good past financial performance is more 
likely to be more transparent in ESG issues.   
 
[Insert Table 5] 
[Insert Table 6]  
[Insert Table 7]  
[Insert Table 8]  
 
 
4.3.1 At country level 
 
Hypothesis 2: ESG/ Environmental disclosure is high in countries where the level of 
economic development is high. 
 
The results in Table 6 and 8 suggest that ESG and environmental disclosure is high in 
countries where the level of economic development is high. This finding should come as no 
surprise as previous studies also show that environmental degradation is attributed to low 
economic development (Husted, 2005; Gnyawali, 1996).  
 
With regards to the corruption index, our results show that a country with less corruption will 
report less forthcoming in ESG/environmental disclosure.  
 
 
4.3.2 At firm level 
 
Hypothesis 3: (a) An increased percentage of insider holdings is associated with a negative 
impact on ESG disclosure (b) An increased percentage of institutional ownership will have a 
negative impact on ESG disclosure (c) An increased percentage of independent directors will 
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have a positive impact on ESG disclosure (d) A greater board size will have a positive impact 
on ESG disclosure. 
We present the relevant empirical results of Hypothesis 3. A higher percentage of insiders 
holdings is detrimental to a firm’s ESG (Table 6) and environmental transparency (Table 8). 
Our results suggest that ESG/environmental disclosure is lower in firms with a higher 
percentage of insider holdings. Our result is similar to Serafeim and Grewal’s (2017) finding, 
which suggests that firms that are larger and less closely held tend to disclose more.  
 
The results we present also show that the percentage of independent directors on the board 
does not significantly affect ESG and environmental disclosure. This result suggests that 
independent board members are not necessarily more interested in ESG transparency than 
inside board members.  
We find supporting evidence showing that ESG disclosure is better in firms with a bigger 
board size. Finally, institutional ownership has a negative impact on ESG and environmental 
disclosure (Table 8). Our finding is somehow similar to the previous two studies (Aggarwal 
and Dow, 2011; Trucost, 2009). Examining the 500 largest US firms, Aggarwal and Dow 
(2011) show that institutional ownership brings a significantly negative impact on a firm’s 
environmental policy. Trucost (2009) suggests that institutional investors do not consider 
carbon exposure as an essential criterion for firm allocation decision.  
We also report the findings for our control variables. The effects of firm size, liquidity 
(current ratio) and R&D intensity across the module specifications shown in Table 6 and 
Table 8 are consistent. Our results suggest that these three factors exert a significant positive 
influence on firm’s ESG/environmental transparency. We conclude that a firm with greater 
firm size, fewer insider holdings, lower percentage of institutional investors, better liquidity 
(current ratio) and higher R&D intensity will be more transparent in ESG issues.  
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V Conclusion 
 
The previous literature concentrates on assessing the best practice for each E, S and G 
dimension. In this study, our contribution is to focus on examining a publicly listed 
company’s ESG transparency and the quantity of ESG disclosure data.  Firstly, we evaluate 
the relationship between a firm’s value (measured as Tobin’s Q) and ESG transparency. We 
adopt the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score as an indicator for a company’s ESG 
transparency. In addition, we model the determinants of the ESG transparency.  
 
Our finding is similar to those of Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2017) and Eccles et al. 
(2001), who suggest that ESG data are value-relevant. We find that more ESG transparency is 
beneficial to value as measured by Tobin’s Q, and there is a non-linear relationship between 
ESG and Tobin’s Q. Our results suggest that ESG transparency can be viewed as additional 
nonfinancial information that provides insight to investors. Our finding also confirms that an 
increase in ESG disclosure can reduce investors’ information symmetry and agency costs, 
which is consistent with the finding of Cheng et al. (2014). With regard to the determinants of 
ESG transparency, our analysis suggests that firms with greater size, fewer insider holdings, a 
lower percentage of institutional investors, better liquidity (current ratio) and higher R&D 
intensity will disclose more on ESG and environmental issues.  
 
Finally, we propose that policymakers and regulators set mandatory or voluntary 
requirements to encourage firms to disclose extensively. Better ESG transparency can only be 
achieved by a collaborative effort between companies, stock exchanges, security regulators, 
investors and corporate reporting organisations, such as SASB and GRI. This study has 
limitations that could give rise to future research. We only examine the quantity of ESG 
disclosure data, but the quality of ESG disclosure is still of interest. As firms provide 
sufficient ESG disclosure to the public in the future, researchers should focus on making ESG 
disclosure data comparable across firms and countries.  
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Table  
Table 1 The definition and our estimation methods for all variables in this study. 
Variable  Symbol Definition / Estimation methods 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q In this study, firm value is estimated by Tobin’s Q. 
 
Tobin’s Q = (market capitalization + liabilities + preferred equity + minority interests) / (total 
assets) 
 
For each sample year, we subtract average Tobin’s Q for the industry from the firm-level 
Tobin’s Q. We have 10 GICS sectors in this study. Data are from Bloomberg.                
ESG disclosure 
 
 
ESG This variable is an indicator of ESG transparency. ESG = (ESG disclosure score/100) 
 
For each sample year, we subtract the average ESG disclosure score for the industry from the 
firm-level ESG disclosure score. There are 10 GICS sectors in this study. Bloomberg 
summarises the ESG disclosure score. Higher scores indicate more transparency on ESG 
issues. 
ESG disclosure^2 
 
(ESG)^2 We use the square of ESG disclosure. 
Environmental disclosure Environmental This variable is as an indicator of Environmental transparency. Environmental = 
(Environmental disclosure score/100) 
 
We subtract the average Environmental disclosure score for the industry from the firm-level 
Environmental disclosure score. There are 10 GICS sectors in this study. Bloomberg 
summarises the Environmental disclosure score. Higher scores indicate more transparency in 
environmental issues. 
(Environmental 
disclosure)^2 
(Environmental)^2 We use the square of Environmental disclosure. 
R&D Intensity R&D Intensity This is the sum of research and development (R&D) costs divided by sales for the prior three 
years. 
Log (Firm asset size) Log (Firm Size) Firm size is natural logarithm of the book value of assets as reported by Bloomberg. 
Leverage ratio 
 
Leverage  Leverage is defined as the debt/total asset ratio as reported by Bloomberg.  
 
For each sample year, we subtract average leverage of the industry from the firm-level 
leverage. There are 10 GICS sectors in this study. 
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Liquidity ratio 
(Current or Quick) 
Current ratio 
 or a Quick ratio 
We adopt the current ratio and quick ratio reported by Bloomberg as our liquidity indicators.    
Institutional ownership Institutional ownership This is the percentage of common equity owned by institutional shareholders. 
Percentages of independent 
director 
Percentages of independent 
director 
This is the proportion of independent directors, who are neither current nor former managers 
of the firm.     
 
Insider holdings Insider holdings This is a percentage of common equity owned by officers and directors. 
Log (Board size) Log (Board size) This is the natural logarithm of the number of directors sitting on each firm’s board as of the 
annual general meeting date in the given year. 
Percentages of women in 
senior management 
Percentages of women in 
senior management 
This is the percentage of women employed in senior management positions at the company. 
Operating margin Operating margin Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is a measure of a 
company's operating performance.  
 
It's an essential way to evaluate a firm's performance without having to factor in tax 
environments, financing decisions and accounting decisions.  
Return on asset  ROA This is the ratio of earnings before interests/ total assets as reported by Bloomberg. 
Three-year average return on 
equity  
ROE3Y This is the average return on equity for the last three years. 
Five-year average return on 
equity  
ROE5Y This is the average return on equity for the last five years. 
PB ratio PB ratio P/B ratio = (share price) / (book value per share) 
Log (GDP per capital based 
on PPP) 
Log (GDP per capital 
based on PPP) 
GDP per capita (PPP based) is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates and divided by total population.  
 
We adopt the data from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 
Database.  
Corruption index 
 
Corruption In this study, Corruption = (Corruption index/100) 
 
We adopt the relevant data from Transparency International from 2012 to 2016. The more the 
corruption, the fewer points are awarded to the country. However, no corruption index data is 
available for the following five sample countries: Indonesia, Colombia, Thailand, Philippines 
and Egypt. We can obtain the responding date for our other forty sample countries. 
This table provides a summary of the variables used in this study. 
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Table 2 Our components obtained from MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) with a sample period 2012-2016 
 Our ten GICS sectors  Firm numbers Our sample includes 47 countries and territories 
1 Consumer discretionary 352 firms Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Macao, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Sandi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, UK, United Arab Emirates, US. 
2 Consumer staple 196 firms 
3 Energy 134 firms 
4 Healthcare 160 firms 
5 Industrials 357 firms 
6 Information technology 225 firms 
7 Materials 207 firms 
8 Real estate 149 firms 
9 Telecommunication services 87 firms 
10 Utilities 129 firms 
Total  1996 firms 
Source: Authors make this analysis. The sample companies in this study are selected from MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) with a sample period from 2012 to 2016, 
which covers approximately 85% of the global investable equity opportunity set. Our sample includes these 47 countries and territories. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of all variables (Currency: US dollar) 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Standard deviation Observations 
(ESG disclosure 
score/100) 
0.3336 0.8678 0.0207 0.1605 7818 
(Environmental 
disclosure score/100) 
0.3149 0.9380 0.0138 0.1771 6321 
Log (Firm Size)  
(measurement unit for 
firm size: million US 
dollars) 
9.1805 13.7467 1.5261 1.3048 9584 
Leverage ratio 
(debt/assets) 
0.2693 3.4680 0 0.1849 9521 
Quick ratio 0.0123 0.9281 0.0000 0.0209 9192 
Current ratio 0.0187 1.7181 0.0000 0.0288 9293 
Tobin’s Q 0.0201 0.4339 0.0038 0.0182 9409 
ROA 0.0597 1.2081 -1.9867 0.0776 9522 
Operating margin 0.1271 25.2599 -150.7216 1.6629 9573 
ROE3Y 0.1547 8.0115 -1.6028 0.2357 9045 
PB ratio 0.0484 15.6820 0.0004 0.3199 9201 
Insider holdings (%) 0.0303 0.8439 0.0000 0.0873 9412 
Percentage of institutional 
investor holding (%) 
0.6180 1.5744 0.0000 0.2936 9412 
Percentage of Women in 
Management (%) 
0.2179 0.7600 0.0000 0.1161 1870 
Log (Board size) 2.3128 4.1109 0.6931 0.2920 8145 
Percentage of 
independent board 
members (%) 
0.5799 1.0000 0.0000 0.2697 7679 
R&D Intensity (%) 0.0466 133.2702 0.0000 1.4161 8928 
Log (GDP per capita 
based on PPP) 
10.5370 11.8953 8.5166 0.5116 9834 
(Corruption/100) 0.6894 0.9200 0.2700 0.1397 9415 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our Equations (4) and (5). Please refer to Table 1 for the definitions of the variables. Our sample period is 
from 2012 to 2016. For each variable, we present the full sample descriptive statistics.  
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Table 4 Analyses of firm performance with “ESG disclosure” and “Environmental disclosure”, 2012-2016 
 Model (1) 
Eq (4) 
Model (2) 
Eq (4) 
Model (3) 
Eq (4) 
Model (4) 
Eq (4) 
Hypotheses Hypothesis 1(a): We assume that the association between 
firm’s performance and the ESG disclosure is conditional on 
agency costs and governance structures. A publicly-listed 
company’s transparency in ESG issues can impact on its 
Tobin’s Q. We predict that the relationship between firm 
performance and ESG disclosure is not linear. 
Hypothesis 1(b): We assume that the association between 
firm’s performance and the Environmental disclosure is 
conditional on agency costs and governance structures. A 
publicly-listed company’s transparency in environmental 
issues can impact on its Tobin’s Q. We predict that the 
relationship between firm performance and Environmental 
disclosure is not linear. 
Dependent variable 
Firm performance- Tobin’s Q  
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 
Estimation method Panel EGLS Period Weights Panel EGLS Period Weights Panel EGLS Period Weights Panel EGLS Period Weights 
 Constant 0.0451*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0453*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0362*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0359*** 
(0.0047) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-adjusted) 
 
-0.0027** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0029** 
(0.0013) 
  
(ESG disclosure)^2 0.0130** 
(0.0062) 
0.0136** 
(0.0063) 
  
Environmental disclosure 
(Industry-adjusted) 
  0.0000 
(0.0010) 
0.0000 
(0.0010) 
(Environmental disclosure)^2   0.0026 
(0.0042) 
0.0022 
(0.0042) 
Log (Firm Size) -0.0046*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0046*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0035*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0002) 
Leverage ratio  
(Industry-adjusted; 
debt/assets) 
  -0.0029** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0024** 
(0.0012) 
Current Ratio     
Quick Ratio    0.0386* 
(0.0204) 
Log (GDP per capital based 
on PPP) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0012*** 
(0.0004) 
R&D Intensity 0.0270*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0290*** 
(0.0062) 
  
Percentages of independent 
director 
0.0080*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0084*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0086*** 
(0.0006) 
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Institutional ownership 0.0022*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0030*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0007) 
Observations (firm number) 1996 firms 1996 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 
Regression Residual normally distributed  normally distributed  normally distributed normally distributed 
Adjusted
2R  0.2037 0.2035 0.1541 0.1552 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in brackets) and diagnostic statistics for Equation(4). There are four specifications of the model. The sample 
comprises 1996 firms from MSCI All-Share Index. Since the residuals of the regression are normally distributed, it indicates that our model is well-specified. Our sample 
period is from 2012 to 2016. Due to lack of availability of Environmental disclosure, missing observations of Environmental disclosure reduce our sample size from 1996 
firms to 1444 firms. Table 4 summarises our empirical results of Equation (4). Model (1) and Model (2) shows that a non-linear relationship exists between firm performance 
and ESG disclosure, whereas this is not the case to the Environmental disclosure in Model (3) and Model (4).    
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Table 5 Analyses on ESG disclosure with the firm performance indicator ROA, 2012-2016 
  Model (1) 
Eq (2) 
Model (2) 
Eq (2) 
Model (3) 
Eq (2) 
Model (4) 
Eq (2) 
 Model (5) 
Eq (2) 
Model (6) 
Eq (2) 
Dependent variable  
   
ESG disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted) 
Dependent 
variable  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
Estimation method Cross-section 
random effects 
Two-stage Least 
Squares – 
Instrument with 
“the average 
growth rate of 
EPS in the last 
three years.” 
Cross-section 
random effects 
Two-stage Least 
Squares – 
Instrument with 
“the average 
growth rate of 
EPS in the last 
three years.” 
 Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
 Constant -0.5416*** 
(0.1642) 
-0.4722** 
(0.1975) 
-0.5416*** 
(0.1642) 
-0.4764** 
(0.1993) 
 Constant -0.8217*** 
(0.1130) 
-0.8190*** 
(0.1146) 
Log (Firm Size) 0.0312*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0277*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0311*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0275*** 
(0.0045) 
Log (Firm Size) 0.0304*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0295*** 
(0.0026) 
ROA (No Industry-adjusted)   -0.0039 
(0.0223) 
-0.1368 
(0.0987) 
-0.0028 
(0.0223) 
-0.1373 
(0.0986) 
ROA (Industry-
adjusted) 
0.0992** 
(0.0411) 
0.0999** 
(0.0404) 
Current Ratio -0.0122 
(0.2523) 
-0.1250 
(0.3323) 
  Current Ratio 1.2355*** 
(0.4210) 
 
Quick Ratio   -0.1608 
(0.2979) 
-0.2881 
(0.3816) 
Quick Ratio  0.5063 
(0.4993) 
Leverage (No Industry-adjusted)    -0.0564**  
(0.0277) 
 -0.0582** 
(0.0276) 
Leverage 
(Industry-
adjusted) 
  
Insider holdings     Insider holdings   
Institutional ownership  
 
  Institutional 
ownership 
-0.0343*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0318*** 
(0.0102) 
Percentages of women in management -0.0485* 
(0.0276) 
 -0.0479* 
(0.0276) 
 Percentages of 
women in 
management 
 -0.0428* 
(0.0255) 
Log (Board size) 0.0213* 
(0.0111) 
0.0209* 
(0.0118) 
0.0212* 
(0.0111) 
0.0208* 
(0.0118) 
Log (Board size) 0.0566*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0547*** 
(0.0126) 
Percentages of independent director     Percentages of 
independent 
director 
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R&D Intensity 0.0967* 
(0.0528) 
0.1483** 
(0.0755) 
0.0920* 
(0.0533) 
0.1530** 
(0.0765) 
R&D Intensity 0.2435*** 
(0.0540) 
0.2772*** 
(0.0578) 
Log (GDP per capital based on PPP) 0.0811*** 
(0.0176) 
0.0764*** 
(0.0207) 
0.0818*** 
(0.0176) 
0.0771*** 
(0.0209) 
Log (GDP per 
capital based on 
PPP) 
0.0670*** 
(0.0125) 
0.0693*** 
(0.0127) 
Corruption -0.2583*** 
(0.0461) 
-0.2296*** 
(0.0535) 
-0.2584*** 
(0.0461) 
-0.2292*** 
(0.0537) 
Corruption -0.2559*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.2579*** 
(0.0334) 
Observations (firm number) 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms Observations 1996 firms 1996 firms 
Regression Residual normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed 
normally 
distributed  
Regression 
Residual 
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
Adjusted
2R  0.1063 0.0726 0.1058 0.0712 Adjusted 2R  0.2462 0.2395 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the ESG disclosure regression in Equation 5, using return on asset 
(ROA) as the firm performance indicator. There are six specifications of the model. The first four models report the regression without an industry-adjusted in the following 
three variables: ESG disclosure, return on asset (ROA) and the leverage ratio. For last two models, Model (5) and Model (6), we use an industry-adjusted measure of these 
three variables. The sample comprises 1996 firms from MSCI All-Share Index. If the residuals of the regression are normally distributed, our model is well-specified. Our 
sample period is from 2012 to 2016.  Moreover, we check for endogeneity issues that may be present in our analyses. We are concerned that the direction of causality 
between return on equity (ROA) and ESG disclosure could run both ways. To ascertain whether this is the case, we use the panel least square estimation method 
supplemented by two-stage least squares where appropriate. Return on asset (ROA) is instrumented by the following variable, the average growth rate of EPS in the last three 
years. We report results from the two-stage least squares analyses in Model (2) and Model (4) in this table.  Based on our empirical results shown in Models from (1) to (4), 
we can confirm that return on asset (ROA) and ESG disclosure are not determined endogenously. However, in Model (5) and (6) with an industry-adjusted in the following 
three variables: ESG disclosure, return on asset (ROA) and the leverage ratio, our empirical results show that the higher the return on asset (ROA) of the firms, the more the 
ESG transparency (disclosure) in firms. 
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 Table 6 Analyses on ESG disclosure with the other four performance indicators: operating margin, the three-year average return on equity, the 
five-year average return on equity the PB ratio, with a sample period 2012-2016 
  Model (1) 
Eq (5) 
Model (2) 
Eq (5) 
Model (3) 
Eq (5) 
Model (4) 
Eq (5) 
Model (5) 
Eq (5) 
Model (6) 
Eq (5) 
Model (7) 
Eq (5) 
Model (8) 
Eq (5) 
Dependent variable  
 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
ESG disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
Estimation method Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
 Constant -0.7979*** 
(0.1113) 
-0.7939*** 
(0.1130) 
-0.8079*** 
(0.1157) 
-0.8048*** 
(0.1176) 
-0.8127*** 
(0.1171) 
-0.8096*** 
(0.1191) 
-0.8065*** 
(0.1113) 
-0.8000*** 
(0.1131) 
Log (Firm Size) 0.0288*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0279*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0295*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0284*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0292*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0281*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0298*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0287*** 
(0.0026) 
Operating Margin (Industry-
adjusted) 
        
Three-year average return on equity  
(Industry-adjusted) 
  0.0193** 
(0.0064) 
0.0181** 
(0.0064) 
    
Five-year average return on equity  
(Industry-adjusted) 
    0.0214*** 
(0.0056) 
0.0200** 
(0.0056) 
  
PB ratio (Industry-adjusted)         
Current Ratio 1.2809*** 
(0.4146) 
 1.3509*** 
(0.4339) 
 1.3601*** 
(0.4445) 
 1.4008*** 
(0.4209) 
 
Quick Ratio  0.6084 
(0.5035) 
 0.6376 
(0.5129) 
 0.6446 
(0.5288) 
 0.7531 
(0.4934) 
Leverage ratio (Industry-adjusted)         
Insider holdings  -0.0936* 
(0.0558) 
 -0.0953* 
(0.0567) 
    
Institutional ownership -0.0331*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0307*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0377*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0352*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0399*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0372*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0289*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0102) 
Percentages of women in 
management 
  -0.0430* 
(0.0260) 
-0.0505* 
(0.0257) 
 -0.0524** 
(0.0260) 
  
Log (Board size) 0.0576*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0559*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0511*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0496*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0500*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0485*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0630*** 
(0.0126) 
0.0616*** 
(0.0127) 
Percentages of independent director         
R&D Intensity 0.2354*** 
(0.0541) 
0.2648*** 
(0.0577) 
0.2670*** 
(0.0568) 
0.2983*** 
(0.0609) 
0.2803*** 
(0.0590) 
0.3120*** 
(0.0633) 
0.2263*** 
(0.0531) 
0.2557*** 
(0.0568) 
Log (GDP per capital based on PPP) 0.0658*** 0.0679*** 0.0682*** 0.0706*** 0.0695*** 0.0718*** 0.0646*** 0.0665*** 
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(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0124) (0.0126) 
Corruption -0.2585*** 
(0.0331) 
-0.2600*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.2656*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.2673*** 
(0.0334) 
-0.2680*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.2696*** 
(0.0336) 
-0.2662*** 
(0.0336) 
-0.2669*** 
(0.0339) 
Observations (firm number) 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 1996 firms 
Regression Residual normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
Adjusted
2R  0.2424 0.2357 0.2472 0.2394 0.2476 0.2397 0.2546 0.2468 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the ESG disclosure regression in Equation 5, using the other four 
performance indicators: operating margin, the three-year average return on equity, the five-year average return on equity, and the PB ratio. There are eight specifications of 
the model, and we use an industry-adjusted measure of these three variables. The sample comprises 1996 firms from MSCI All-Share Index. If the residuals of the regression 
are normally distributed, our model is well-specified for the sub-sample. Our sample period is from 2012 to 2016. The empirical results (Models 3, 4, 5, and 6) show that the 
higher the “three-year average return on equity” and the higher the“five-year average return on equity”, the more the ESG transparency and the Environmental transparency 
(disclosure) in firms. 
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 Table 7 Analyses on Environmental disclosure with the firm performance indicator ROA, 2012-2016 
  Model (1) 
Eq (2) 
Model (2) 
Eq (2) 
Model (3) 
Eq (2) 
Model (4) 
Eq (2) 
 Model (5) 
Eq (2) 
Model (6) 
Eq (2) 
Dependent variable  
 
environmental 
disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted)   
environmental 
disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted)   
environmental 
disclosure  
No Industry-
adjusted)   
environmental 
disclosure  
(No Industry-
adjusted)   
Dependent 
variable  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure 
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure 
(Industry-
adjusted) 
Estimation method Cross-section 
random effects 
Two-stage Least 
Squares – 
Instrument with 
“the average 
growth rate of 
EPS in the last 
three years.” 
Cross-section 
random effects 
Two-stage Least 
Squares – 
Instrument with 
“the average 
growth rate of 
EPS in the last 
three years.” 
 Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
 Constant -0.9212*** 
(0.2132) 
-0.8400** 
(0.2611) 
-0.9232*** 
(0.2137) 
-0.8437*** 
(0.2629) 
 Constant -1.0180*** 
(0.1538) 
-1.0059*** 
(0.1559) 
Log (Firm Size) 0.0400*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0382*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0399*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0381*** 
(0.0061) 
Log (Size) 0.0411*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0397*** 
(0.0035) 
ROA (No Industry-adjusted)   -0.0133 
(0.0323) 
-0.1124 
(0.1096) 
-0.0129 
(0.0324) 
-0.1130 
(0.1089) 
ROA (Industry-
adjusted) 
0.1404*** 
(0.0541) 
0.1388*** 
(0.0533) 
Current Ratio -0.1865 
(0.3558) 
-0.1041 
(0.4603) 
  Current Ratio 1.8766*** 
(0.5612) 
 
Quick Ratio   0.0589 
(0.4208) 
-0.2946 
(0.5310) 
Quick Ratio  1.0652 
(0.6525) 
Leverage (No Industry-adjusted)    -0.0815** 
(0.0360) 
-0.0495* 
(0.0291) 
-0.0838** 
(0.0358) 
Leverage 
(Industry-
adjusted) 
  
Insider holdings -0.1078* 
(0.0622) 
 -0.1069* 
(0.0622) 
 Insider holdings -0.1408* 
(0.0735) 
-0.1416* 
(0.0726) 
Institutional ownership -0.0288* 
(0.0171) 
 
-0.0284* 
(0.0171) 
 Institutional 
ownership 
-0.0805*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0778*** 
(0.0138) 
Percentages of women in management -0.1096*** 
(0.0367) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.0371) 
-0.1090*** 
 (0.0367) 
-0.1036*** 
 (0.0371) 
Percentages of 
women in 
management 
-0.1527*** 
 (0.0344) 
-0.1630*** 
(0.0340) 
Log (Board size)  0.0302* 
(0.0169) 
 0.0303* 
(0.0169) 
Log (Board size) 0.0463*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0436** 
(0.0171) 
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Percentages of independent director     Percentages of 
independent 
director 
  
R&D Intensity 0.1827** 
(0.0788) 
0.1962* 
(0.1059) 
0.1762** 
(0.0795) 
0.1991* 
(0.1072) 
R&D Intensity 0.1487** 
(0.0644) 
0.1837*** 
(0.0686) 
Log (GDP per capital based on PPP) 0.1082*** 
(0.0232) 
0.0974*** 
(0.0277) 
0.1088*** 
(0.0232) 
0.0979*** 
(0.0278) 
Log (GDP per 
capital based on 
PPP) 
0.0805*** 
(0.0166) 
0.0829*** 
(0.0168) 
Corruption -0.3112*** 
(0.0629) 
-0.2687*** 
(0.0739) 
-0.3110*** 
(0.0630) 
-0.2681*** 
(0.0742) 
Corruption -0.2783*** 
(0.0433) 
-0.2787*** 
(0.0436) 
Observations (firm number) 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms Observations 1444 firms 1444 firms 
Regression Residual normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed 
normally 
distributed  
Regression 
Residual 
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
Adjusted
2R  0.1021 0.0741 0.1012 0.0726 Adjusted 2R  0.2307 0.2229 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the Environmental disclosure regression in Equation 5, using return 
on asset (ROA) as the firm performance indicator. There are six specifications of the model. The first four models report the regression without an industry-adjusted in the 
following three variables: Environmental disclosure, return on asset (ROA) and the leverage ratio. For last two models, Model (5) and Model (6), we use an industry-adjusted 
measure of these three variables. The sample comprises 1444 firms from MSCI All-Share Index. If the residuals of the regression are normally distributed, our model is well-
specified. Our sample period is from 2012 to 2016.  Moreover, we check for endogeneity issues that may be present in our analyses. We are concerned that the direction of 
causality between return on equity (ROA) and the environmental disclosure could run both ways. To ascertain whether this is the case, we use the panel least square 
estimation method supplemented by two-stage least squares where appropriate. Return on asset (ROA) is instrumented by the following variable, the average growth rate of 
EPS in the last three years. We report results from the two-stage least squares analyses in Model (2) and Model (4) in this table.  Based on our empirical results shown in 
Models from (1) to (4), we can confirm that return on asset (ROA) and the environmental disclosure are not determined endogenously. However, in Model (5) and (6) with an 
industry-adjusted in the following three variables: the environmental disclosure, return on asset (ROA) and the leverage ratio, our empirical results show that the higher the 
return on asset (ROA) of the firms, the more the environmental transparency (disclosure) in firms. 
 
 
  
Firm’s ESG transparency – Country versus Firm Effects 
33 
 
Table 8 Analyses on Environmental disclosure with the other four performance indicators: operating margin, the three-year average return on 
equity, the five-year average return on equity the PB ratio, with a sample period 2012-2016 
  Model (1) 
Eq (5) 
Model (2) 
Eq (5) 
Model (3) 
Eq (5) 
Model (4) 
Eq (5) 
Model (5) 
Eq (5) 
Model (6) 
Eq (5) 
Model (7) 
Eq (2) 
Model (8) 
Eq (2) 
Dependent variable  
 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
environmental 
disclosure  
(Industry-
adjusted) 
Estimation method Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
Panel EGLS 
Period Weights 
 Constant -0.9882*** 
(0.1513) 
-0.9745*** 
(0.1535) 
-0.9892*** 
(0.1575) 
-0.9766*** 
(0.1600) 
-0.9864*** 
(0.1593) 
-0.9734*** 
(0.1620) 
-1.0045*** 
(0.1522) 
-0.9873*** 
(0.1545) 
Log (Firm Size) 0.0390*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0377*** 
(0.0034) 
0.0406*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0389*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0409*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0392*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0404*** 
(0.0035) 
0.0388*** 
(0.0035) 
Operating Margin (Industry-
adjusted) 
        
Three-year average return on equity  
(Industry-adjusted) 
  0.0280*** 
(0.0088) 
0.0263*** 
 (0.0088) 
    
Five-year average return on equity  
(Industry-adjusted) 
    0.0317*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0297*** 
(0.0077) 
  
PB ratio (Industry-adjusted)         
Current Ratio 1.9391*** 
(0.5529) 
 2.0545*** 
(0.5739) 
 2.0952*** 
(0.5830) 
 2.1042*** 
(0.5668) 
 
Quick Ratio  1.2063* 
(0.6583) 
 1.2520* 
(0.6670) 
 1.2708* 
(0.6832) 
 1.3800** 
(0.6532) 
Leverage (Industry-adjusted)         
Insider holdings -0.1494** 
(0.0733) 
-0.1499** 
(0.0724) 
-0.1389* 
(0.0752) 
-0.1411* 
(0.0741) 
   -0.1268* 
(0.0766) 
Institutional ownership -0.0792*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0767*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0832*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0804*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0839*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0808*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0743*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.0719*** 
(0.0139) 
Percentages of women in 
management 
-0.1448*** 
(0.0346) 
-0.1559*** 
(0.0343) 
-0.1613*** 
(0.0348) 
-0.1721*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.1629*** 
(0.0351) 
-0.1735*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.1273*** 
(0.0350) 
-0.1388*** 
(0.0345) 
Log (Board size) 0.0472*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0448*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0388** 
(0.0172) 
0.0366** 
(0.0172) 
0.0369** 
(0.0174) 
0.0348** 
(0.0174) 
0.0527*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0506*** 
(0.0173) 
Percentages of independent director         
R&D Intensity 0.1368** 
(0.0642) 
0.1666** 
(0.0683) 
0.1665** 
(0.0662) 
0.1988*** 
(0.0706) 
0.1746** 
(0.0677) 
0.2083*** 
(0.0723) 
0.1305** 
(0.0644) 
0.1608** 
(0.0685) 
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Log (GDP per capital based on PPP) 0.0793*** 
(0.0163) 
0.0813*** 
(0.0166) 
0.0804*** 
(0.0169) 
0.0829*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0805*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0830*** 
(0.0173) 
0.0786*** 
(0.0165) 
0.0805*** 
(0.0167) 
Corruption -0.2827*** 
(0.0431) 
-0.2821*** 
(0.0435) 
-0.2897*** 
(0.0432) 
-0.2895*** 
(0.0436) 
-0.2941*** 
(0.0434) 
-0.2938*** 
(0.0438) 
-0.2956*** 
(0.0439) 
-0.2939*** 
(0.0444) 
Observations (firm number) 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 1444 firms 
Regression Residual normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
normally 
distributed  
Adjusted 2R  0.2271 0.2193 0.2307 0.2217 0.2307 0.2213 0.2336 0.2248 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
This table reports regression coefficients (standard deviations in parentheses) and diagnostic statistics for the environmental disclosure regression in Equation 5, using the 
other four performance indicators: operating margin, the three-year average return on equity, the five-year average return on equity, and the PB ratio. There are eight 
specifications of the model, and we use an industry-adjusted in the following three variables: the environmental disclosure, return on asset (ROA) and the leverage ratio. The 
sample comprises 1444 firms from MSCI All-Share Index. If the residuals of the regression are normally distributed, our model is well-specified. Our sample period is from 
2012 to 2016.  The empirical results (Models 3, 4, 5, and 6) show that the higher the “three-year average return on equity” and the higher the “five-year average return on 
equity”, the more the environmental transparency (disclosure) in firms. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Impact of ESG disclosure on Tobin’s Q  
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This Figure shows the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the linear and quadratic ESG disclosure variables since the latter are statistically significant in the performance 
regression in Equation 4. Our sample group comprises 1996 firms from MSCI All share index from 2012 to 2016. The group average of ESG disclosure is reported as 0.33 in 
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this figure. The more information disclosed, the higher the disclosure score. The Bloomberg score ranges from 0 to 100. In this study, we estimate the ESG disclosure as the 
ratio of Bloomberg ESG scores divided by 100. Therefore, the max value of ESG disclosure in this Figure is one.   
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Figure 2 ESG Disclosure vs Environmental Disclosure  
  
 
Source: This figure is made by the authors and the relevant data are collected from Bloomberg. The sample firms are selected from the components of MSCI All-Share Index. 
Our sample period is from 2012 to 2016. 
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Appendix - Table A1.  Correlation matrix 
Variable Leverage ROA ESG Log(Size) Insider Institutional Quick Current Women Operating 
Margin 
Return3 
average 
Return5 
average 
Tobin 
Q 
PB Log(GDP) Corruption Environmental 
disclosure 
Log(board) Independent R&D 
Intensity 
Leverage 1                    
ROA -0.1904 1                   
ESG 0.0151 -0.0967 1                  
Log(Size) 0.0747 -0.3764 0.4119 1                 
Insider -0.0389 -0.0011 -0.0827 -0.2051 1                
Institutional 0.0003 0.1164 -0.1211 -0.0644 -0.2719 1               
Quick -0.2563 0.1291 0.0192 -0.0827 0.0194 0.0679 1              
Current -0.3097 0.1250 0.0280 -0.1369 0.0126 0.0930 0.8912 1             
Women -0.0247 0.1937 -0.1530 -0.1068 0.0473 0.0886 0.0068 -0.0119 1            
Operating 
Margin 
0.2494 0.3543 -0.0087 -0.0192 -0.1010 0.0257 0.1552 0.0892 0.0676 1           
Return3average 0.1050 0.4829 -0.0369 -0.2003 -0.0259 0.0757 -0.0603 -0.0862 0.1548 0.1635 1          
Return5average 0.1142 0.4738 -0.0316 -0.2063 -0.0186 0.0690 -0.0706 -0.0968 0.1519 0.1521 0.9495 1         
Tobin Q -0.1111 0.7972 -0.1469 -0.4293 0.0529 0.0956 0.1656 0.1477 0.2038 0.2382 0.4277 0.4174 1        
PB 0.1056 0.4478 -0.0444 -0.2287 0.0154 0.0852 -0.0390 -0.0748 0.1733 0.1002 0.7181 0.6604 0.6043 1       
Log(GDP) -0.1043 -0.0845 0.0294 0.1799 -0.0143 0.0907 0.1350 0.1211 0.1769 0.0014 0.0356 0.0435 -
0.0646 
-
0.0062 
1      
Corruption -0.1314 -0.0694 -0.1404 0.0811 -0.0873 0.1185 0.0209 0.0587 0.1610 -0.0552 -0.0016 -0.0004 -
0.0352 
-
0.0275 
0.7514 1     
Environmental 
disclosure 
-0.0009 -0.0822 0.9618 0.3963 -0.0672 -0.1571 0.0581 0.0661 -0.1848 -0.0137 -0.0368 -0.0317 -
0.1292 
-
0.0412 
0.0361 -0.1250 1    
Log(board) 0.1149 -0.1614 0.3008 0.4310 -0.0662 -0.0175 -0.1219 -0.1472 -0.0837 -0.0768 0.0114 0.0178 -
0.1712 
-
0.0560 
-0.0231 -0.1143 0.2674 1   
Independent 0.0464 0.0014 0.0365 0.2345 -0.2199 0.3464 0.0302 0.0252 0.2412 0.1723 -0.0399 -0.0481 -
0.0149 
-
0.0318 
0.3015 0.3409 -0.0153 -0.0999 1  
R&D Intensity -0.1886 0.0712 0.0928 0.0565 0.0012 0.0970 0.3994 0.3373 0.0765 0.0480 -0.0424 -0.0434 0.1872 0.0242 0.1767 0.1122 0.1264 -0.0071 0.1349 1 
 
 
 
